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FOREWORD

Notwithstanding the claims of some in the United States,
European affairs continue to dominate U.S. foreign policy and
strategic thinking. The end of the Cold War has not seen any
blurring of the focus of U.S. officials on European affairs.
Managing the implications of the break-up of the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact, the seemingly never-ending conflicts in the
Balkans, encouraging the growth of Western norms and
institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and expanding and
reforming the North Atlantic Alliance are just some of the issues
that require firm and consistent U.S. leadership.
How the United States has, and should continue, to deal with
these issues is the subject of this collective effort. In addition to
assessing past and present challenges to U.S. and Western
security interests and objectives in Europe, the authors also
analyze the strategies and policies of the Department of Defense
in this crucial region of the world. Recommendations for
consideration by officials include the need for a lighter leadership
“touch” in some areas and for stronger encouragement in others.
However, let there be no doubt that a U.S. policy toward Europe of
stasis or benign neglect should be rejected. The United States is a
European power by virtue of its history, current commitments,
and strategic and political exigencies. Finding the most
efficacious means of achieving these national objectives, while
working to effect a “Europe whole and free,” is the daunting
long-term task to be faced.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this essay as
a contribution to the debate on the future direction of U.S. policy
toward Europe.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Interim Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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EUROPEAN SECURITY:
WASHINGTON’S SHAPING STRATEGY
IN ACTION

Whether the already close links between the United
States and Europe will draw tighter in the 21st century is an
open question. Indeed, some observers argue that the
relationship may weaken somewhat over time. 1 But no one
has argued persuasively that the trans-Atlantic link will be
broken. Anticipated conditions, moreover, indicate that,
while the strength of the relationship may wax and wane,
ties will remain close. Information-age technologies will
entwine U.S. and European economies more inextricably
than in the past. Despite increasing extra-European ethnic
diversity, many Americans will still trace their roots to
Europe, and American culture and norms will remain
predominantly European-based.
In the security arena, the Atlantic Ocean long ago ceased
to provide a protective moat. No longer mentally or
physically isolated, events in Europe almost immediately
affect the United States. Furthermore, the United States
also has learned from experience that remaining aloof from
European security issues or merely reacting to events can
be extremely costly. The articulation of preventive defense
and engagement strategies in the last few years augurs for
continued, albeit different, close cooperation between the
United States and its European allies, partners, and friends
to shape the future security environment to their mutual
benefit. 2
This confluence of U.S. and European economic,
cultural, and security ties ensures that the continued
security and stability of Europe will remain a vital U.S.
national interest, as demonstrated during the recent
conflict in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. This conclusion
should not be surprising. Successive U.S. administrations
have remained consistently engaged in European security
1

affairs for six decades. More recent administrations have
made engagement with Europe a keystone of U.S. policy. 3
Such policies can be expected to extend and deepen into the
future.
This monograph offers observations on how the United
States can positively shape the European security
environment of the next century. It first outlines a preferred
U.S. vision of a future Europe. The discussion next
identifies potential obstacles to that goal, and then assesses
risks to U.S. national interests if these obstacles cannot be
overcome. Political, economic, and military initiatives for
achieving the U.S. vision for a future Europe then follow. As
part of the military initiatives, the discussion specifically
assesses the current Commander-in-Chief (CINC) U.S.
European Command’s (USEUCOM) Strategy of Readiness
and Engagement. Conclusions and recommendations close
the monograph.
DEFINING EUROPE
Before outlining a future vision of Europe, developing a
common understanding of what constitutes Europe is
important. This is not a straightforward proposition,
however, as even Europeans do not always agree on what
constitutes the “common European house.” 4 Within this
monograph, we define Europe broadly and inclusively: from
the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, from the Arctic
Ocean to the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian Seas. 5
That having been said, discussion of Russia, Belarus,
Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus focuses on the effects of
those nations on the overall security of Europe.
Arguing where the dividing lines fall between Central,
Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, and the
clarity of those lines varies considerably depending upon
one’s nationality or worldview. 6 The fact that many
countries fall under more than one grouping (e.g., the
Balkans, the Baltics, Iberia, and Transcaucasia) only
complicates matters. Rather than getting bogged down in
2

debates over who should or should not be part of a particular
region, therefore, our definitions will be encompassing and
overlapping. 7
A FUTURE VISION OF EUROPE
As the British statesman, Lord Palmerston, noted 150
years ago: “. . . interests are enduring and perpetual . . . .” 8
Thus, the underlying durability of U.S. national interests
identified in A National Security Strategy for a New Century
can offer insights into U.S. national interests in Europe 20
years hence.9 European stability will remain foremost a
vital U.S. national interest. 10 This includes continued
stability in Western, Central, and Southern Europe, as well
as the more difficult objective of increasing governmental
and economic stability in Southeastern Europe, Eastern
Europe, and Transcaucasia. Two strategic goals
predominate. First, to assist in the building of a Europe that
is democratic, prosperous and at peace, i.e., truly
integrated. Second, to work with allies and partners to meet
future challenges to collective interests that no nation can
confront alone. Of particular import are the Newly
Independent States (NIS) of Eastern Europe, where the
United States has vital security interests. Specifically, the
United States wishes Russia, Ukraine, and the other NIS to
evolve peacefully into democratic market economies and
become prosperously integrated into the world community.
This also includes democratic and economic reform in the
NIS, as well as the other maturing democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe, that will contribute to continued
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of these
states. The means by which the United States meets these
challenges is through a robust and reformed NATO, thereby
providing “the anchor of American engagement in
Europe.” 11
Maintaining stability in Europe does not connote,
however, an intent to sustain the existing status quo. To the
contrary, the United States seeks continued transformation
3

of Europe that increases the number of democratic,
market-based economies, founded on the rule of law and
respect for human rights. 12 Such major changes in many
fragile states can generate considerable instability. The
United States seeks to dampen instability and keep
transitions within peaceful bounds.
Extending these interests into the future, we propose a
desired U.S. vision of a future Europe 20 years hence that
includes:
1) A politically pluralistic Europe whole and free and
governed by the rule of law.
2) Individual human rights and the rights of ethnic
minorities protected through international norms and rule
of law.
3) The free movement of peoples, ideas, capital, and
goods.
4) Expanded and more sophisticated institutional
mechanisms to prevent conflict, and, if conflict should arise,
resolution through peaceful means.
5) Increased economic liberalization and integration of
Europe through, inter alia, expansion of the European
Union (EU).
6) Expanded European role and responsibility for
leadership in European security matters.
7) Increased military integration within NATO and
participation in the Partnership for Peace program (PfP).
8) Full control and accountability of materials from the
former Soviet Union and prevention of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

4

POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO THE FUTURE
VISION OF EUROPE
To shape successfully conditions to the mutual benefit of
the United States and Europe first requires identifying and
overcoming potential obstacles to achieving our common
vision. In this manner, the United States, in conjunction
with its European allies, partners, and friends can take
active steps to produce desired outcomes rather than simply
reacting to events as they occur. This also should be a more
effective and efficient means of using constrained resources
to attain mutual goals. Potential obstacles to the vision of
the future Europe fall under the general categories:
economic, political, and security issues.
Economic Obstacles.
Within the economic arena, the failure of
Europe—whether as a whole or several major powers—to
adjust to changing economic conditions poses the greatest
potential problem. For European Union (EU) countries and
the remainder of Northern, Western, and Central Europe,
this could result from a failure to transition to what the
current vernacular describes as information-based
economies. This is not a call for wholesale overturning of the
existing European industrial base. That portion of the
economy will remain essential for prolonged economic
health, but it probably should not continue at the current
scale or in its present form. Greater emphasis will have to be
placed on preparing for the demands of global
competitiveness by making economics more flexible and
dynamic. 13
For example, if European national and pan-European
economies are to remain competitive on a global scale, they
must address a number of structural issues. These will
include significant changes in labor laws and employment
practices, especially reducing the high degrees of rigidity in
labor markets. This will be particularly true in France and
Germany which must confront workplace reform if the EU
5

collectively is to be competitive internationally. The close,
indeed sometimes incestuous, relationship among business,
labor unions, churches, and political parties also will have
to be loosened if Europeans are to achieve the higher levels
of productivity necessary to compete globally. Relations
among businesses, banks, and government also must
undergo similar reform. Increasingly burdensome social
welfare and state pension systems, let alone intractable
structural unemployment, also will have to be addressed. If
Europeans cannot address these critical issues, they risk
being left behind globally, at best. At worst, economic
stagnation or relative decline could lead to domestic
political instability in some key countries in Europe. 14
The emerging democracies in Central, Eastern,
Southern, and Southeastern Europe will have to complete
the transition from centrally controlled to market
economies. 15 This will be a difficult transition. Many of these
countries have limited, if any, recent experience with
market-based economies, and have great difficulty dealing
with normal market cycles. 16 Frequently, they lack even
rudimentary tax, property, or business laws. Banks and
credit institutions are limited in number, and often are
viewed with suspicion. There is also considerable potential
for organized crime to flourish or less than legitimate
organizations to move into the gaps in laws and
governmental regulations. Finally, many of these countries
will have to shake off the 50 years of experience with
state-controlled, centralized planning and financing and
effect policies that encourage market forces to shape the
economic environment.
This transition to greater reliance on the private market
place will not be easy. Many countries have little historical
practice with developed market economies, and some have
hardly any relevant experience at all. 17 This lack of
experience leaves them vulnerable to modern day
carpetbaggers, to corruption within government, to the
potential for robber barons (à la the U.S. experience in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries), and to criminals who
6

will exploit gaps in legal systems that have not yet fully
matured. This may require a more incremental approach to
the privatization of industry and transition to market-based
economics than some outsiders originally may have
believed desirable. 18 The vulnerability of Europe’s new
states to criminality and corruption could, in some
instances (notably Romania and Bulgaria), become a threat
to their internal security, especially if internal criminality
links up with foreign networks, e.g., the Russian Mafia’s
international crime links. 19
Many of these states also face the daunting challenge of
moving from an obsolescent, if not antiquated, industrial
base that focused for over five decades on military
production to an information age economy that can compete
in the global market place. They must do all this while
providing levels of consumer goods and services sufficient to
satisfy their populations, while coping with market
fluctuations. Under the best of circumstances, this
transition period could lead to short-term economic
contraction in many countries. 20 If not handled carefully,
severe economic dislocation could occur, leading to
considerable political backlash. Faced with dashed
expectations, severely reduced buying power, bare shelves,
and unemployment, many publics may long for return to
authoritarian rule and controlled economies that once
provided minimum levels of support (food, housing, medical
care, and pensions) and for times when disparities in wealth
and treatment were not as well-known. This chimera,
however, will only lead to further deterioration in economic
conditions.
On the other hand, some evolving countries and societies
may learn from past successes or failures to take the best
and avoid the worst of the transition. They may weather
some intense short-term pain for long-term economic
payoff.21 If they can make this significant leap, they may be
able to move more directly into the global, information-age
economy.

7

Failure to incorporate Russia and the NIS into the
European and global economies is perhaps the greatest
potential economic obstacle to realizing the proposed vision
of Europe. The remainder of Europe and the United States
can try to fulfill the twin requirements of absorbing goods
from these countries and providing investment capital, but
unfortunately there is only so much they can do. Moreover,
there is only so much expertise and capital these countries
can effectively absorb.
This will be no easy task. Russia, especially, will have to
revolutionize itself all over again. The government must
enact and enforce laws and policies that foster economic
growth and protect property. It will have to demilitarize the
economy and allow prices and values to seek their natural
levels. Support for public sector investment will be key, as
will the creation of a fair, equitable, and enforceable tax
system that supports public and private sector goals.
Support for private enterprise will have to be greater than
heretofore has been the case. This especially may be true of
agriculture and land ownership. Last, but not least, Russia
must foster an economic climate that provides an incentive
for foreign investment.
Western initiatives will necessarily depend on Russian
policies and their implementation. But even before Russia
makes these decisive transformations, there are major
opportunities for successful public and private programs in
Russia. For example, U.S., European, and Russian
initiatives need to confront Russia’s ecological and public
health crises. This would include long-term initiatives, such
as building hospitals, training medical personnel, and
providing modern diagnostic and treatment equipment.
But, it also could include rudimentary, but important
short-term programs: furnishing disposable hypodermic
needles, offering vaccines and medicines, ensuring clean
water for hospitals, and preventing malnutrition. Such
programs not only can win enormous public support, they
can help prevent or mitigate future health crises. There is
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no reason why these and other initiatives cannot be
undertaken now.
Beyond economic conditions in Russia and the NIS,
three additional and interrelated issues stand in the way of
realizing the desired European economic end state: chronic
un/underemployment, bloated state welfare systems
(coupled with declining populations in some cases), and
immigration. These problems are due largely to the fiscal
costs inherent in the deeply ingrained social welfare
mindset and bureaucracy within many European states,
especially expectations of “cradle to grave” state support.
Anticipated immigration trends will only further challenge
many already stressed social welfare systems. Moreover,
because publics often view newcomers, refugees or ethnic
minorities as the source of much unemployment and strain
on social welfare systems, this may create or exacerbate
ethnic, cultural, or religious animosities in many societies.
The United States may be able to offer only limited
assistance in these matters. In most countries, these issues
are entangled with internal political issues, and any U.S.
influence is likely to be limited. Indeed, most nations are
likely to view U.S. actions as interference in their sovereign
affairs. The best the United States can do is to serve as an
example of how economic progress through market
economics eventually offers a way out of such dilemmas,
occasionally offer government funds, and, if asked, provide
advice. The U.S. Government also could encourage private
investment which may appear less intrusive and, therefore,
more acceptable. Moreover, the demands of the
marketplace and profit motives may make private
investment more effective over the longer term.
Although remote, one cannot ignore the potential for a
EU-U.S. trade war that could sidetrack the preferred vision
of a future Europe. Such an outcome would require a series
of blunders on both sides of the Atlantic, but U.S. and
European leaders cannot afford to dismiss such a
possibility. The perception of fewer and less important
9

mutual economic interests, failed or significantly delayed
European economic integration, contraction of economies
on either side of the Atlantic, an oil crisis with Europe and
the United States on opposite sides (especially in
conjunction with other economic declines), or intense
competition for information-age markets could lead to a
trade war.22 Undoubtedly, cooler heads would ultimately
prevail, but damage could be extensive, hindering the
attainment of desired outcomes for Europe.
Political Hurdles.
The greatest political hurdles to achieving our vision of
the future Europe stem from the reversal of representative
government in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., as has
happened in Belarus). The most obvious case is Russia, but
Ukraine follows in close order. Moderate-sized states like
Bulgaria and Romania also could hinder European
integration if their countries reverted to authoritarian rule.
As the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans demonstrate,
authoritarian regimes in even small countries can
adversely influence the entire European security climate.
Should this occur in Central or Southeastern Europe (e.g.,
Czech Republic or Hungary, and Bulgaria or Romania,
respectively), the shock waves would reverberate
throughout most of the Continent. 23
Another potential political problem concerns the erosion
of state sovereignty, which could emerge from several
causes. Multinational organizations, such as the EU,
NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) could take on aspects of traditional state
responsibilities for economics, political representation, and
security. Concomitantly, the rise of regional organizations,
particularly economic or trade groups, could further
undermine the power of the state. 24 Thus, in pursuing
increased integration, the United States and its European
partners must tread the fine line between yielding too much
or too little power to these organizations.
10

Reductions in state sovereignty do not necessarily lead
to adverse consequences. Regional trade partners,
consortia, and complementary business organizations can
work to the advantage of the regional organizations and the
countries involved. The danger is that regional groupings
could undermine state unity leading to dissolution of
current states. 25 Again, this is not deleterious in and of
itself. The devolution of state authority could be managed to
avoid adverse outcomes, even to promote economic growth.
But it is a delicate process, especially ensuring that it does
not lead to political instability or a security vacuum.
A rise in nationalism or ethnic separatism also could
inhibit the political portions of the desired end state. Such
issues continue to hold considerable appeal, especially in
Eastern and Southern Europe where young democracies
may not yet possess the maturity to weather severe
economic or political stress. Even within well-established
democracies in Western and Central Europe, there are
sizable nationalist or ethnically driven parties that have
exerted considerable influence in recent elections. 26 A
severe economic downturn could further increase the
influence of such groups.
Erosion of the key Franco-German relationship also
could upset European political integration. This special
association was the catalyst and has been the glue that has
facilitated much of West Europe’s successful political and
economic integration. 27 A substantial lessening of these
bonds could fracture the consensus that has driven
ever-increasing pan-European integration. 28 Such an
erosion could occur in two general ways. Over time, the
Germans and the French (or other Europeans) may perceive
that conditions have improved to the point that the
relationship no longer holds the same level of importance. In
this case, there would be little cause for alarm, as a unified
Germany would be firmly anchored into European political,
economic, and security institutions.
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Another potential pitfall concerns who will lead this
partnership and how that leadership will be exerted. For
the last 50 years, Germany has deferred not only to France
but to most of its transatlantic partners. Recovery of full
German sovereignty, coupled with Germany’s economic
power and the passing of the torch to the post-World War II
generation of political leaders, may result in greater
German assertiveness in foreign affairs. 29 This does not
argue that Germany will be less cooperative, but the
relationship will be different than it has been in the past,
and France and the remainder of Europe will have to
accommodate themselves to these new conditions.
More ominous would be Central and Eastern European
issues drawing German attention and aspirations away
from Western and Central European institutions. This
could stem from a collapse within Russia, ethnic conflict
within Ukraine or the Baltic states, or an economic collapse
that overwhelms Central European institutions. In such
cases, the United States and other European allies and
partners would have to take steps to ensure that Germany
remained firmly tied to the EU and NATO. Such an adverse
outcome is unlikely, however. The Franco-German
relationship has endured despite perennial contretemps
and crises. At this point, it appears to be functioning, in fact
as strongly as during the 1980s. The intent here simply is to
acknowledge that less than optimistic outcomes are
possible, and to ensure that such possibilities are factored
into efforts to shape the future security environment.
Security Obstacles.
A broad range of security issues could hinder achieving
the overarching goals of peaceful European integration.
Conflict within the Balkans is one obvious hurdle.
Long-standing Greek-Turkish tensions over a wide
spectrum of issues could seriously disrupt the entire future
European security environment. 30 A wide range of potential
trouble spots along the Mediterranean (due to cultural,
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economic, and religious differences; possibility of northward
migration; proliferation of sophisticated conventional
weapons and WMD, as well as the means to deliver
them—especially, ballistic and cruise missiles) could
overturn a peaceful European security environment.
Continuing conflict in the Transcaucasus region already is
troublesome and tensions over control of oil in the region
could exacerbate pressures. Individually, each issue could
generate considerable repercussions; collectively they could
have devastating effects on European stability. The United
States must work with its European allies, partners, and
friends to preclude such a detrimental confluence.
The road to a Common Security and Foreign Policy
(CSFP) and the European Security and Defense Identity
(ESDI) contains a number of potential potholes. On the one
hand, Europeans could fail to create the necessary
consensus to forge and sustain a CSFP. 31 Presently, for
example, many European states are preoccupied with
internal economic and political issues. This could result in
differing perceptions of threats, with the potential for
divisive debates over whether a CSFP is needed. Even
should a CSFP emerge, considerable interpretation over its
implementation might occur. Again, differing threat
perceptions could lead to dissonance over security
burdensharing. Such outcomes could lead to national or
regional rifts. Under worst-case conditions (e.g., severe
economic or political setbacks), this might even precipitate
the renationalization of defense structures by some
countries. One should recall that the integration of
European defense forces within NATO has had the
important result of acting as an effective confidence- and
security-building measure, i.e., providing reassurance of
benign national military intentions. Obviously, where
renationalization might occur would make considerable
differences, but the consequences could be significant.
A strong, cohesive CSFP and ESDI also could have
consequences that would require careful management. The
United States might reduce its presence in Europe, for
13

example. While this outcome is not inherently detrimental
to U.S. national interests, the United States and Europe
will have to manage carefully the level of U.S. residual
presence, as well as reexamine current stationing
arrangements (i.e., permanently shifting U.S. Army forces
from Germany to the Balkans?) to preclude a European
perception that the United States no longer judges its
interests in Europe as being vital. Similarly, U.S. leaders
must ensure that reduced presence does not lead to
disengagement from Europe, or some form of neoisolationism.
A robust ESDI might have a number of additional
consequences. Calling upon Europeans to become greater
partners also means that the United States must accept
Europe’s larger decisionmaking role in the partnership.
There may be times when it would be judicious of the United
States to temper the predominant leadership role that it
practiced during the Cold War. Concomitantly, this also will
require Europeans to assume greater responsibilities than
they have been willing to take on in the past.
Shared leadership also will complicate consensus
development. The United States frequently arrives at its
internal decisions through the long, convoluted, and
arduous inter-agency process. Other governments develop
their own policies using similar mechanisms, as vividly
demonstrated during the build-up to the Kosovo conflict. It
is unrealistic to expect allies and partners to react more
quickly than can the United States. This will require some
adjustment, at times considerable, to the U.S. penchant for
deciding first and seeking consensus later. As seen during
the NATO response to the crisis in the Balkans in the early
1990s, difficulties in forging consensus prolong decisionmaking, especially when there may be disagreement over
interests, objectives, and the ways and means to achieve
them. This does not argue against the United States
encouraging a strong European defense pillar; it simply
means that the United States will have to adapt its
leadership methods to accommodate change.
14

Last, but certainly not least, the proliferation of WMD
could considerably upset the European security
environment. While proliferation within Europe
undoubtedly would be highly detrimental, current
conditions argue against such an outcome. That having
been said, Russia and other NIS states have many scientists
with great expertise in WMD who are inadequately
employed and could be a source of expertise for a nation
embarked upon a WMD program, as a result of resurgent
nationalism and denationalization of defense, for
instance. 32
The development of WMD outside of Europe, but which
could be used in Europe or against European interests,
however, is a cause for alarm. A number of nations on
Europe’s periphery may have nascent WMD programs and
may be working on the sophisticated means to deliver them.
Additional states could acquire such capabilities within the
next 20 years. 33 Moreover, technological advances almost
certainly will permit nations currently out of range of
effective delivery to perfect adequate means for reaching
European targets. Such conditions undoubtedly would
influence security matters in Europe, and affect U.S.
national interests.
Nor is it necessary for states or groups to develop a
weapons-grade device and delivery system. Attaching
chemical or nuclear materials to a simple car bomb would be
sufficient to cause considerable short-term physical, as well
as significant longer-term casualties. The tremendous
potential for cascading effects of WMD on economic and
political conditions is obvious. Increased efforts to support
nonproliferation of WMD, and to safeguard existing nuclear
materials, therefore, should be a matter of high priority.
REDUCING RISKS TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
If the United States and Europe in partnership cannot
overcome these obstacles, prospects are dim for achieving
our preferred vision of a future Europe. We propose a
15

number of political, economic, and security initiatives,
therefore, to help turn our proposed vision into reality. We
do not present these policy options as stark choices:
implement these initiatives or face failure. No one can
forecast the outcomes with a high degree of detail. Indeed,
even if all initiatives were partially or fully implemented,
circumstances could lead to outcomes detrimental to U.S.
national interests. Our thrust is that these initiatives offer a
reasonable opportunity for success. The analysis points out
the possible (and in some instances, worst case) outcomes
that the United States seeks to avoid by taking active steps
now to shape the future European security environment to
the mutual benefit of Europe and the United States.
Political Initiatives.
Perhaps the most significant political initiative has
more to do with the United States than it does with Europe
per se. As indicated earlier, the United States may have to
adopt a new leadership style for dealing with its European
counterparts. This will be most apparent within NATO, but
will extend to other arenas as well. The United States must
examine whether it routinely will seek to build consensus or
generally will rely on unilateral action. It must examine
whether it seeks to remain primus or is more willing to
share greater power in decisionmaking. Obviously, the
ultimate outcome will depend heavily on how much
responsibility Europeans are willing to assume, and how
consensus builds within Europe for CSFP, ESDI, and EU
political integration. An important indicator of “Europe’s”
ability to assume such a position will be how these countries
accept the lessons of the Kosovo conflict in modernizing
their militaries to enable them to have the necessary
capabilities to project and sustain military power,
independent of U.S. assistance. 34 But, the decisive factor
will depend upon the role that the United States sees for
itself in Europe, and how it fulfills its vision of a future
Europe. There will be growing pains in this new
relationship, on both sides of the Atlantic. But, if Europe is
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to be a greater partner—not simply in Europe, but in
support of mutual interests around the globe—then the
United States at some point will have to relinquish some
power.
In some cases, the United States may have to pressure
reluctant Europe to assume that power and the
responsibility that goes with it. This may be especially true
for regions outside of Europe. 35 But, as the world economy
becomes more interdependent, European businesses and
governments will find that stability in key regions will be
key to continued economic health in Europe. This may well
bring about a greater convergence of U.S. and European
interests in promoting stability around the globe.
At the same time, Europeans must wean themselves
from overdependence upon the United States and take
greater responsibility for the course of events in Europe.
This will require building European consensus on long-term
structures and policies (e.g., CSFP, ESDI), as well as the
ability to reach agreement during short-term crises without
relying on the United States to be the ultimate arbiter of
European squabbles. 36 Equally, this will require European
nations to reconcile national interests to solve largely
European problems (e.g., violence in the Balkans,
Greek-Turkish issues, or conflicts in Transcaucasia). This
also will require the United States to exercise patience and
allow Europe the time necessary to forge such consensus.
In this regard, the United States should continue
support for the evolving European CSFP. While this is a
natural consequence of increased political and economic
integration, a CSFP also would simplify (theoretically) U.S.
dealings with Europe. Because of the diverse national
interests within the EU, much less within Europe as a
whole, the development of such a policy is likely to proceed
with fits and starts, will frustrate Europeans, and,
occasionally, aggravate the United States which will want
to deal with a more cohesive partner. At the same time, the
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United States must understand that a CSFP may not
always coincide with U.S. policy.
Less contentious is continued U.S. support for further
political, as well as economic, evolution of the EU. This
includes increased integration, as well as support for
further enlargement. The EU must ensure, however, that
membership is available to all that qualify. To create a
Europe, united and whole, the EU will have to ensure that
the door to the “common European home” remains open to
all that qualify. The United States must encourage such
openness, and, when necessary, coax the EU to ensure
opportunities for accession.
Support for individual human rights should remain a
key pillar of a future vision of Europe. States emerging from
decades, even centuries, of authoritarian rule may not yet
have grasped fully the principle that safeguarding
individual human rights is a fundamental responsibility of
democratic governments. Monitoring human rights,
providing economic and political rewards and incentives,
and, if necessary, punishing human rights abuses must be a
joint U.S.-European responsibility and a high priority. For
the moment, the United States should support efforts to
give the Council of Europe more teeth in dealing with
human rights issues within its member states.
Similarly, minority rights must be protected if there is to
be long-term stability and security in Europe. Although the
Balkans and the Transcaucasus are the current hot spots,
other regions of Europe are not immune from these
debilitating crises. 37 Migration, economic dislocation, and
unemployment oftentimes are perceived through a
majority-minority lens that all too frequently generates
animosity that spills over into violence. In many European
countries, this will be an extremely sensitive, even divisive,
issue. Some states will view outside concern for minority
rights as unnecessary and unwanted interference in their
internal affairs. Other European states may hesitate to
criticize or counteract minority discrimination in other
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countries out of fear of stirring ethnic unrest within their
own borders. U.S. and European governments, however,
must respond quickly and vigorously to any abuses. If not,
they risk highly destabilizing ethnic conflicts.
Lastly, the United States, within the OSCE framework,
should energize all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
Successes within the so-called “security basket” are
well-known.38 That success may allow the OSCE and its
constituents to devote more time, effort, and resources to
the other two “baskets”: human rights and cooperation in
economics, science and technology and the environment. 39
This will not require new initiatives, necessarily, but the
United States could use the OSCE forum to focus attention
on key political initiatives that support desired U.S. goals
for Europe.
Economic Initiatives.
While the United States also should pursue initiatives in
the economic arena, most of the impetus for these efforts
will have to come from within Europe. Similar to political
efforts, much of the economic work will occur within the EU
or will result from EU efforts. U.S. support for EU
enlargement will contribute to the economic well-being of
Europe, as a whole, with consequent effects on the global
and U.S. economies.
The United States also should continue to assist in
reforming and facilitating the integration of the Russian
and Ukrainian and European economies. Here, the United
States can lend direct assistance to Russia by assisting in
the development of basic property and fiscal law. In
conjunction with EU expertise, U.S., Russian, and
Ukrainian interlocutors can ensure legal compatibility with
EU regulations, national laws, and international law to
shape an environment that supports prolonged economic
development. These same groups could help develop legal
procedures and organizations to combat criminal activity in
the economic arena. Contingent upon the success of these
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initiatives, the United States could offer additional capital
investment in Russia and Ukraine that supports
integration efforts. This also would be contingent upon
greater confidence that such funds would not fall into the
hands of corrupt or criminal elements.
Some may argue that, given the current state of
economic reform in Russia and Ukraine, there are no sound
policies to reward and that the United States has done all
that it can. There may be merit to this conclusion. 40
However, the stakes are simply too high to let matters run
their course. The United States, in conjunction with major
European economic powers, will have to undertake efforts
to develop an economic climate within Russia that is
capable of at least minimal integration with Europe.
Without such integration, Russia, and perhaps Ukraine,
could slip into economic chaos that would have grave
repercussions for Europe and beyond.
While assisting the Russian and Ukrainian economies is
a top priority, the United States also must provide support
to the other NIS, as well as emerging democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe. While support need not necessarily be
on a scale equal to the two major powers, relatively limited
investment could result in significant economic and political
pay-offs. This could be done unilaterally, but preferably
should be accomplished in conjunction with our European
allies and partners. At the very least, the United States
should support International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank efforts in Central and Eastern Europe. This
may require the United States to increase its contributions
(both relatively and absolutely) to achieve the desired ends.
This may be a difficult sell to some elements of Congress and
the U.S. public, but it is a short-term investment with
considerable potential for long-term gain. 41
The United States also should consider incentives that
continue to encourage greater private investment in these
nations, as well as their neighbors. This could be in the form
of tax credits, subsidies or partial loan guarantees. Again,
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the purpose behind such initiatives would be to exploit the
energy and discipline of the marketplace, vice statist,
practices. For instance, largely through private investment,
the United States may be able to directly assist in the
development of Caspian and Central Asian oil reserves.
This could have several consequences beyond private sector
profit or loss. First, it may make the nations in Central and
Eastern Europe depend less on Russian petroleum products
(and preclude potential economic coercion). Second, it could
produce considerable revenues for poorer countries in the
region that desperately need it. Third, the prospects for
economic generation hold the potential to dampen
long-standing animosities in the region, although this is an
optimistic hope. 42 Fourth, significant production could
reduce European (and perhaps global) dependence upon
Middle Eastern oil.
Security Initiatives.
The United States has significant interests and
responsibilities around the globe. This leads to high
demands on U.S. armed forces in Europe and beyond.
Moreover, U.S. forces possess unique capabilities (e.g.,
satellites, intelligence, and command, control, and
communications) or have capabilities that greatly exceed
others (e.g., power projection and logistics support). The
combination of wider interests and greater military
capabilities translates into increased demands for U.S.
forces around the globe.
To ensure that demands do not strain the U.S. armed
forces or the U.S. Treasury, Washington must continue to
encourage our European allies to assume greater
responsibility for maintaining stability and security in
Europe. An agreed ESDI would be a first step in providing
the capabilities necessary for Europe to assume a larger role
in providing for its own security. 43 It also is a prerequisite for
more effectively modernizing and transforming European
forces from their Cold War preoccupation with territorial
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defense to forces capable of protecting national interests.
Such changes also could better prepare European military
forces for increased participation in shaping activities. Most
importantly, ESDI offers the opportunity for creating the
power projection capabilities needed to handle
smaller-scale contingencies within Europe, as well as along
its periphery. Certainly, when interests dictate, the United
States must be prepared to assist its allies and partners in
these matters. But, Europe must progressively assume
greater responsibility for its own security.
An effective ESDI can be a two-edged sword for the
United States, however. Beyond the benefits outlined
above, an effective ESDI coupled with improved
conventional capabilities could translate into increased
European independence in foreign and military policy. This
may offer Europeans greater latitude of policy and military
operations than has previously been the case. Within the
military sphere—as in the political arena—therefore, the
United States may have to adapt its leadership style to
reflect shifting power relations within NATO, as well as
between Europe and the United States.
At the same time, the capabilities needed for ESDI also
could serve European interests beyond the Continent,
should that be necessary. These same capabilities also could
support common European-U.S. interests in other key
regions of the globe. This could permit a rationalization of
defense responsibilities and liabilities that keeps the U.S.
defense burden within manageable limits, avoiding what
historian Paul Kennedy refers to as “imperial
overstretch.” 44 Thus, while leadership “costs” may be
inherent in the formulation of an effective ESDI, the
cost-benefit analysis is favorable.
Even with a developing ESDI, the United States will
have to maintain an adequate military presence in Europe
for the first decades of the 21st century. This does not
contradict the need for supporting ESDI. The fact remains
that building an effective ESDI will not occur overnight and
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Europeans will need time to create the requisite capabilities
and to transform military organizations shaped by four
decades of the Cold War. The United States will have to
sustain its presence over this period of transition. Thus,
while the United States should wean Europe from too
strong a dependence upon U.S. military power, a
precipitous U.S. withdrawal at this time could leave a
leadership vacuum that Europeans are not yet prepared to
fill. How quickly and to what degree this should occur
undoubtedly will be the subject of considerable debate in
Washington and European capitals.
One point of that debate may depend on how NATO
nations respond to the integration of the armed forces of the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and any future
invitees. The United States may have to ensure that the
addition of these forces is not used as an excuse for existing
NATO members to decrease their own respective forces.
Moreover, as these forces are integrated into the Alliance’s
military structure, the United States and its NATO allies
must ensure that current capabilities are suitably
restructured and modernized to meet the demands of the
anticipated future security environment. 45
The size and focus of the U.S. presence in Europe
undoubtedly will change. Force size, structures, and
organizations will adapt to accommodate evolving security
conditions. Most important may be the shift from the Cold
War focus on Central Europe to greater attention to
smaller-scale contingencies along Europe’s southern and
southeastern borders. Increased levels of peacetime
engagement activities to shape the European security
environment will be important, as well. This will require
different capabilities, or at least a different proportion of
capabilities, than was case during the Cold War.
That having been said, forces remaining in Europe will
have to retain credible combat capability. To contribute to
deterrence and reassurance roles in Europe, these forces
still will need adequate levels of combat power. Despite the
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obvious improvements in the European security
environment, these forces undoubtedly will be called upon
to respond to smaller-scale contingencies in Europe or along
its periphery. They also must remain capable of responding
rapidly to a major conflict in another theater of operations
beyond Europe. To maintain an adequate balance between
shaping and responding missions will require deft
restructuring of U.S. forces in Europe.
The United States also can use support for ESDI as a
means of improving modernization and interoperability
with its Europeans allies and partners. This could help
avoid unnecessary and debilitating intra-Alliance debates
over standardization, rationalization, and interoperability
that have plagued the Alliance in the past. 46 Used properly,
ESDI could lead to pooled research and development efforts
that conceivably could save the United States and Europe
time and resources. Obviously, increased military
integration should accompany these overarching security
changes. While it is still too early to say when and where the
North Atlantic Council might invite other European states
to join the Alliance, prudence dictates that Alliance
structures and practices must continue to evolve to prepare
NATO for such eventualities.
U.S. support for further enlarging NATO will require
further adaptation of the Alliance’s integrated military
structure. In the near term, this will require integrating the
declared forces of the several armed forces from the new
accessions to the Alliance (Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland). To assist this effort, the U.S. Government will have
to convince a somewhat skeptical Congress to continue
supporting infrastructure spending in NATO to assist new
members. 47 The U.S. Government also will have to ensure
that European allies shoulder a fair share of that burden.
Perhaps more difficult will be U.S. efforts to adapt the
military command and control structure of the Alliance.
Such efforts, to date, have borne limited fruit. 48 The crux of
future adaptation hinges on determining how best to return
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France to the Alliance’s military structure without
debilitating military planning and execution capabilities.
As the recent brouhaha over command of Allied Forces
Southern Europe demonstrates, this will be no easy
task. 49For the moment, this may mean implementing
current initiatives, and letting the French grasp in their
own time the advantages of halting their obstructionist
behavior. Over the longer term, especially if ESDI becomes
a reality, the United States may have to soften its current
hard-line stance on who occupies key command positions
within the integrated military structure.
Further enhancements of the existing PfP program also
will benefit the European security climate. On the one hand,
new initiatives may assist nations in preparing for ultimate
NATO membership (should they desire). On the other hand,
should a nation not opt for NATO membership, such
program enhancements could increase cooperation between
NATO and nonmembers. Some potential initiatives include:
1) Designation of PfP “deployable forces” and some as yet
undefined relationship with existing NATO-declared
multinational headquarters;
2) Greater detail in the current “Planning and Review
Process” to make it more similar to the Alliance’s force
planning process;
3) Increased “Partner Staff Elements” participation with
the International Military Staff and the top two levels of the
integrated command structure;
4) Increased numbers of international posts in the Partnership Coordination Cell; and,
5) Additional partner diplomatic missions accredited to
NATO Headquarters.
In addition to the highly successful PfP Program, the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council provides the education
and experience necessary for potential members to learn
how to work inside NATO. It also enhances multinational
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security cooperation and allays Russian fears should
Moscow participate in it. The program also allows for the
integration of Ukraine and the Baltic States into the
European security agenda and provides reassurance and
some form of tangible or visible concern for their security.
Most of these initiatives hold the promise of helping
meet U.S. objectives not only in Europe but also in
responding to future crises outside Europe. Using PfP to
ensure that partner states are compatible with ESDI will
help ensure that Europeans will be better prepared to
cooperate with the United States when mutual interests
will benefit. This will not only reduce the U.S. defense
burdens in Europe, but also globally, while increasing the
effectiveness of potential coalitions.
At the very least, these programs singly or in
combination should increase transparency in security
affairs. Within NATO, they will help prevent the
renationalization of members’ defense policies. Outside
NATO, these measures should reduce the incentives for
individual nations to pursue unilateral security policies
that might cause anxiety among their neighbors. At best,
they can contribute to increased defense integration within
NATO, as well as Europe as a whole.
CINC USEUCOM’s Strategy of Readiness and
Engagement.
Support of CSFP, ESDI, NATO enlargement and
adaptation, and PfP are longer-term initiatives. To support
U.S. interests and policies in Europe in the near term,
USEUCOM has outlined a number of strategic objectives in
CINC USEUCOM’s Strategy of Readiness and Engagement
(1998). The intent here is not to examine each objective in
detail. On their face, these objectives support U.S. interests,
goals, and policies. The task here is to assess their ability to
contribute to the vision of a future Europe.
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Seven (of eleven) USEUCOM objectives directly relate to
shaping Europe’s 21st century security environment:
1) Maintain, support, and contribute to the integrity and
adaptation of NATO.
2) Help prepare the militaries of invited nations to integrate with NATO.
3) Promote stability, democratization, military professionalism, and closer relationships with NATO in the
nations of Central Europe and the NIS.
4) Support U.S. efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress
for the Dayton process; develop military institutions in the
former Yugoslavia adapted to civilian control.
5) Ensure freedom of maritime and aeronautic lines of
communication.
6) Provide prompt response to humanitarian crises.
7) Maintain a high state of readiness in EUCOM forces. 50
Within the USEUCOM strategy, NATO remains the
centerpiece of U.S. engagement in Europe. The Alliance is
uniquely positioned to meet the continued demands of
collective defense of its members, and through NATO
enlargement, chartered relationships with Russia and
Ukraine, and PfP activities to support inclusive mutual
security arrangements throughout Europe 51. USEUCOM
efforts to support the Alliance, therefore, are considerable.
Within NATO, USEUCOM helps fulfill the military aspects
of enlargement. It contributes to further evolution of
command and control arrangements and provides
substantial forces and capabilities—especially intelligence,
communications, and power projection—to Alliance
military authorities.
External to the Alliance, USEUCOM supports PfP
activities and uses bilateral activities to assist invited
nations to prepare for NATO membership. 52These activities
also foster increased professionalism within Central and
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Eastern European armed forces and civilian control over
those forces. 5 3 USEUCOM also promotes closer
relationships with friendly democratic neutrals that
support NATO efforts to increase stability and
transparency in defense matters in the rest of Europe.
Moreover, USEUCOM uses bilateral contacts with Russia
and Ukraine to bolster the chartered relationships between
those two countries and NATO. 54 Four particular initiatives
deserve special note: the George C. Marshall Center for
European Security Studies, the Joint Contact Team
Program, the State Partnership Program, and the
Department of Defense’s security assistance program. 55
These efforts build trust and confidence that contribute to
increased understanding and stability in Europe.
USEUCOM also plays a major role in supporting U.S.
efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress for the Dayton
peace process. Providing the bulk of the U.S. force
contribution to the Implementation Force (IFOR) and
Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations and the National
Support Element in Hungary, alone, is a significant
achievement. Adding to these challenging deployments has
been the U.S. contribution to the NATO-led Allied Force
campaign against Yugoslavia and the subsequent
contribution of U.S. forces to the Kosovo Implementation
Force (KFOR). U.S. forces (largely drawn from USEUCOM
units) participating in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR have made
signal contributions beyond the requirements laid out in the
various peace implementation agreements. These include
assistance in infrastructure restoration, economic
restructuring, serving as role models for professional armed
forces that are subject to civilian control, and assisting in
elections at all levels of government over the course of the
past 3 years. 56 These initiatives have directly contributed
not only to the restoration of a safe and secure environment
in Bosnia, but also have directly assisted in that nation’s
recovery from the depths of a vicious civil war.
In addition to its work inside Bosnia, USEUCOM also
has launched peacetime engagement and shaping activities
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in the remainder of the Balkans, as well as in Central
Europe that have contributed further to the prospects for a
self-sustaining peace in the region. USEUCOM has
supported the U.N Preventive Deployment Force
(Operation ABLE SENTRY in U.S. parlance) along the
border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM). The success of this deployment has been noted
nearly universally. 57 Moreover, USEUCOM units are in the
forefront of combined U.S.-international efforts to stabilize
the post-conflict situation in Kosovo. Together, these
actions not only have contributed significantly to
short-term stability in the former Yugoslavia, but also may
serve as the foundation for longer-term stability within the
Balkans, as a whole.
Some observers may view “ensure freedom of maritime
and aeronautic lines of communication” as being more a
response than a shaping activity. Such an interpretation
may be unnecessarily narrow, however. Responding to a
particular crisis occasionally may overlap with long-range
shaping activities. Thus, responding and shaping can have
complementary purposes. Creating the conditions that
allow for the free and unfettered use of lines of
communication within USEUCOM’s area of responsibility,
for example, certainly contributes to a positive future
security environment. Thus, a freedom of navigation
exercise in the Gulf of Sidra or exercises in the Black Sea
establish precedents that will shape future actions and
security conditions.
Providing prompt response to humanitarian crises also
would appear to fall more under responding than shaping.
But there is still a portion of such missions that support
engagement. First, rapid response helps shape conditions
for peaceful resolution of an ongoing crisis, or prevents
humanitarian conditions from expanding into a conflict,
whether internal or external. Second, by mitigating dire
economic consequences, such humanitarian responses help
eliminate or mitigate conditions that might contribute to
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future instability or conflict. Third, humanitarian
responses contribute to a well of goodwill that the United
States may find useful some day. Lastly, the U.S. position as
a world leader demands that the United States take the lead
in many humanitarian efforts. Indeed, in some cases, the
United States may be the only nation that possesses the
requisite capabilities needed to conduct such operations
(e.g., long-range transportation, global communications,
and logistics).
None of these initiatives will bear fruit, however, unless
USEUCOM forces maintain a high state of readiness. This
applies to combat and noncombat roles. Readiness provides
the sine qua non for maintaining USEUCOM’s ability to
fight and win a major theater war, and to respond effectively
to the full range of potential crises. These capabilities also
undergird USEUCOM’s contribution to deterrence, as well
as its ability to support operations in other theaters of
operation. In short, without adequate attention to
readiness, USEUCOM will have great difficulty carrying
out the initiatives, planned or potential, that will shape
Europe’s 21st century security environment to the mutual
benefit of Europe and the United States. 58
To help ensure readiness, while fulfilling the National
Military Strategy, CINCEUR recognized the need to plan
theater-wide peacetime activities. As a result, EUCOM
developed a unique process for planning and executing what
has become known as “shaping” activities, conducted under
the strategy of engagement. The Theater Security Planning
System produced strategy documents at all levels (theater,
region, and country). The purpose of this process was to vet
the objectives that support strategies. Using the
USEUCOM’s Theater Security Planning System as a
model, the Joint Staff developed the Theater Engagement
Planning System, which is currently used throughout the
combatant commands to develop shaping strategic concepts
and shaping activities. 59 Currently, EUCOM conducts
approximately 3,000 engagement activities annually,
within some 30 different categories of “activities.” 60
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Finally, the 1998 revision of the Unified Command Plan
has assigned to EUCOM the following new countries for
planning and shaping responsibilities: Moldova, Ukraine,
Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well as the
Black Sea. 61 This has increased significantly the command’s
responsibilities, particularly for planning and executing
shaping activities. Ukraine now becomes USEUCOM’s
largest shaping program. 62
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The importance of U.S. national interests in Europe is
unlikely to abate in the period under examination.
Increased cooperation between the United States and
evolving European political, economic, and security
organizations could lead to even greater trans-Atlantic
bonds. The United States, therefore, has a considerable
stake in bringing to fruition the vision outlined above (or
one similar to it). Despite the obvious fact that posited
conditions will benefit the United States, Europe and its
citizens also would garner tremendous advantages. Thus,
Europe, too, has a stake in such a positive outcome.
But such an outcome is not guaranteed. U.S.-European
cultural affinities may diminish. In the absence of a massive
external threat, perceived mutual U.S.-European interests
may lessen. Economic competition between the United
States and Europe or among large regional trading blocs for
global or regional markets could be intense, further
magnifying the divergence of interests. For this vision to
become reality, therefore, will require mutual efforts and,
sometimes, substantial changes on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Nonetheless, we generally do not see any need for
dramatic changes in the ongoing economic, political, and
security evolution of Europe. Certainly, we would welcome
any acceleration of positive trends that will increase the
number of market democracies that seek to resolve disputes
through peaceful means. But this does not call for wholesale
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overhaul of current systems. Indeed, too rapid a change may
create instability that the United States and Europe hope to
avoid. Thus, we support evolutionary initiatives and
continued progress along foreseeable lines.
On the economic front, Europe must continue to widen
and deepen its economic institutions. Accession to the EU,
particularly, must remain a viable option for all eligible
countries. The important decision made at the EU Helsinki
summit in December 1999 to open membership accession
negotiations to expand the community from 15 to 28 or more
countries is noteworthy for European security. 63 That said,
economic integration does not have to occur strictly through
the EU. The EU and nonmembers should be free to pursue a
“variable geometry” that accommodates national and
regional differences within the larger organization. The
intent, rather, is to pursue options that make national
economies more open and to preclude a catastrophic
economic failure that affects large portions of the European
and global economies.
This last point underscores the importance of ensuring
that Russia, especially, but also Ukraine and the other NIS
states merge their economies into the European economic
system. The inability to effect such integration risks
creating a tiered system of “haves” and “have-nots,” where
the latter group may perceive that it has no stake in
supporting European stability. Indeed, such “have-nots”
may conclude that they have tremendous incentive to
overturn existing European economic, political, and
security institutions, architectures, and systems.
European economic integration should occur in close
partnership with the United States. Much more can be
accomplished, for example in integrating Russian and NIS
economies into European and global economies, if the
United States and key European nations and institutions
cooperate. Equally, hostile trade competition or, worse,
debilitating U.S.-EU trade wars could significantly damage
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long-term U.S. and European national interests not only in
the economic sphere, but also in security matters.
Recommended changes in European political institutions generally parallel the economic transformations
outlined above. Increased political integration that includes
all European nation-states is a desirable and achievable
goal. More important, perhaps, than increased
pan-European institutions is a greater focus on ensuring
individual and minority rights. Redressing real or perceived
inequities in minority rights, in particular, will greatly
improve the potential for long-term stability within Europe.
In the security arena, Europe should strive to create an
effective European Security and Defense Initiative. The
United States should support such efforts. This should not
require, however, creating new mechanisms or erecting new
“institutions,” if they are at the expense of creating needed
military capabilities. Europe should evolve its role in
security affairs within existing structures, such as OSCE,
EU/Western European Union (WEU), NATO, PfP, and the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), for example.
These organizations, if properly adapted, can resolve
impending conflicts or, if violence breaks out, take the
necessary steps to halt conflict and achieve a lasting
political settlement. An excellent example of this capability
and potential results is the ongoing significant internal
adaptation of NATO.
This adaptation will have to include changed roles and
participation in security institutions. European states will
have to take a larger role in ensuring their own security.
This will mean, as well, taking the steps necessary to ensure
that they possess the military capabilities needed to meet
the potential challenges of the 21st century security
environment. This also will mean less reliance on the U.S.
political leadership within European security
organizations, as well as during crises. A stronger European
security role also should lead to improvements in military
capabilities, which many European states have let languish
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over the last decade. At the same time, these changes will
require the United States to alter how it cooperates with
Europe, relying more heavily on prior consultation and
developing consensus prior to rather than after the fact. It
also may mean that the United States must let go of some of
its authority and leadership positions. While psychologically difficult, these changes can occur without
damaging U.S. or European national interests.
A continued U.S. military presence in Europe will
remain an essential element of the European security
environment for the foreseeable future. Partially, this is to
reassure allies and partners of the continued U.S.
commitment to Europe, which will be especially important
during this period of transition. These forces also will play a
key role in shaping the future European and global security
environments through a broad range of peacetime
engagement and shaping activities. Especially important
may be helping former communist militaries transform
themselves into defense establishments that conform to the
norms of democratic civil-military relations. Should a crisis
arise in Europe, U.S. military units also would be positioned
to respond quickly. They also could foster compatible, if not
common, doctrine and operational procedures among
potential coalition partners to facilitate combined
operations within or outside Europe. Lastly, forces
stationed in Europe will be positioned to respond quickly to
crises that may erupt in other areas of the world or to
support operations in other theaters.
While all elements of the U.S. armed forces will
contribute to a future presence in Europe, land forces will
play the more dominant role. Land forces are less transient
than sea or air forces, and, therefore, provide greater
reassurance to allies and partners. Equally, land forces are
most appropriate for performing the broad range of
missions that fall under peacetime engagement and
shaping activities. Because most emerging democracies
depend most heavily on land forces, moreover, U.S. Army
units and personnel offer the better role model for
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appropriate civil-military relations. Similarly, land forces
offer the best means for facilitating the development of
common doctrine and operational procedures. Lastly,
because of the nature of probable crises in Europe, land
forces may predominate in any responses.
Achieving desired political, economic, and security
conditions in Europe that benefit both Europe and the
United States will not happen on its own. As indicated
above, a number of obstacles will have to be overcome, not
the least of which will be the integration of Russia, Ukraine,
and the NIS into Europe’s political, security, and,
especially, economic systems. But while difficult, these
challenges are not overwhelming. Progress may come in fits
and starts, and occasional strains in trans-Atlantic
relations will occur. But none of these difficulties will be
insurmountable. With perseverance and close cooperation
the United States and Europe can turn the vision into
reality.
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